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HISTORY

9389/33

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

October/November 2016

1 hour

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains **three** sections:

Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939

Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust

Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

The marks are given in brackets [] at the end of each question.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

This document consists of **4** printed pages and **1** Insert.

Section A: Topic 1**The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939**

- 1** Read the extract and then answer the question.

‘Empire’ is a grand word. But behind its facade stood a mass of individuals, a network of lobbies, a mountain of hopes: for careers, fortunes, religious salvation or just physical safety. The Empire was not made by faceless committees making grand calculations, nor by the ‘irresistible’ pressures of economics or ideology. It had to be made by men and women whose actions were shaped by motives and morals no less confused and demanding than those that govern us now. Far from being the mere handiwork of kings and conquerors, it was largely a private-enterprise empire: the creation of merchants, investors, migrants and missionaries, among many others. Building an empire was not just an act of will or an imaginative impulse, though both were essential. It required a long chain of mundane activities to bring it about: the surveying of targets; the founding of bridgeheads; the raising of money; the recruiting of sailors, soldiers, emigrants and adventurers; the rallying of allies (not least at court or in government); the writing of rules; the regulation of trade as well as of moral behaviour in exotic locations; the framing of governments. One of the most difficult tasks, but one of the most vital, was settling the terms on which indigenous peoples and their leaders would become the allies, the clients or the subjects of empire. It is easily forgotten that, across much of the world, empire was made as much if not more by these local allies as by the imperialists themselves. The result was an empire of hybrid components, conflicting traditions, and unsettled boundaries between races and peoples: a source of constant unease as well as extraordinary energy.

It was also, and crucially, an unfinished empire. When we stare at old maps of the world with their masses of British imperial pink, it is easy to forget that this was always an empire-in-making. As late as 1914 the signs of this were everywhere: in the scattered strands of settlement that made up Canada and Australia; in the skeletal administration of tropical Africa; in the chronic uncertainty over what kind of Raj would secure British control and appease Indian unrest; in the constant promises that there would be no further imperial expansion, and the no less constant advances. Indeed, the most ardent Edwardian imperialists believed that far from constructing a durable edifice, the Victorian makers of empire had bequeathed their successors little more than a building site and a set of hopelessly defective plans.

If empire on closer inspection betrayed its improvised and provisional character, there were good reasons for this. No single vision of empire had inspired its founders. Instead, society at home threw up a mass of competing interests and lobbies that pursued different versions of expansion and empire. Colonising, civilising, converting and commerce coexisted in uneasy and often quarrelsome partnership as the objects of empire. The command and control of this empire was always ramshackle and quite often chaotic. To suppose an order uttered in London was obeyed round the world by zealous proconsuls is a historical fantasy. For this was an empire that depended on the cooperation of local elites, on the loyalty of settlers and the often grudging acquiescence of British officials, impatient of Whitehall’s demands. None of these could be tested too far. Each was susceptible to countless local pressures and problems unsuspected in London. Imperial governance was by necessity a series of compromises, some of them forced by the explosive rebellions that periodically blew it onto the rocks. Empire in practice required the continual adaptation of the methods of rule.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: Topic 2**The Holocaust****2** Read the extract and then answer the question.

To view in proper perspective the failure of Roosevelt's Administration to do everything that might have been done to save Jewish lives, an appreciation of the domestic and international problems involved in mass rescue is necessary. The rescue of European Jewry was so severely circumscribed by Nazi determination that it would have required an inordinate passion to save lives and a huge reservoir of goodwill towards Jews to achieve it. Such passion to save Jewish lives did not exist in the potential receiving nations. In the case of the United States, one can readily see today that a projection of human concern inwards to its own domestic problems such as alleviating the misery of its own racial minorities had barely begun. What hope of better treatment could be held for a foreign minority?

There were factors on the domestic political scene that further limited action on the Administration's part. Any suggestion of the slightest infringement of the immigration quota system would produce protests. The anti-Jewish thrust of the anti-refugee sentiment did not escape the notice of Jewish leadership in the United States, who found it difficult to dismiss the rantings of spokesmen of anti-Semitism. In Congress, for example, the negative response to the Wagner-Rogers Bill to save German-Jewish children, as contrasted to the favourable response to the evacuation of non-Jewish British children, was too apparent to escape notice. Extending a helping hand to a foreign minority was a political risk which Roosevelt was not willing to take, and the Administration's response was to go through the motions of rescue without taking the risk of implementing them. Undoubtedly this partly explains the paradox of the State Department's use of the innocuous label 'political refugees' and maintaining it long after it had become apparent that the Reich meant to liquidate all Jews. By concealing the anti-Jewish character of the Nazi atrocities behind a neutral cover, Roosevelt may have sought to lessen the predictable outcry about favouritism towards Jews at home.

The Administration's reluctance to publicly acknowledge that a mass murder was taking place went far in keeping public opinion ignorant and therefore unaroused, while it helped convince men like Goebbels that the Allies approved or were at least indifferent to the fate of the Jews. A statement by Washington that the massive raid on Hamburg in July 1943 was made in retribution for Treblinka, or better yet a bombing of the death camp's rail lines and crematoria, would have gone far to pierce the 'curtain of silence', not only in the United States but among the people of occupied Europe. Specific mention of the crime against Jews was omitted from war-crimes statements and not until March 1944 could Roosevelt be persuaded to make some correction to the Moscow War Crimes Declaration which had hitherto neglected to mention the Final Solution. The failure of John J. McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War, to favourably consider a request by the World Jewish Congress to bomb the crematoria because it would be of 'doubtful usefulness' was especially tragic. Washington maintained its silence for fear, in McCloy's words, that it might 'provoke even more vindictive action by the Germans'. Berlin, it was felt, was fully capable of escalating the terror. But for European Jewry, at least, it is difficult to imagine a terror greater than that of Auschwitz.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: Topic 3**The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950****3** Read the extract and then answer the question.

Many bitter words were publicly exchanged during the course of the Paris Peace Conference which concluded in October 1946. A marked feature was the mechanical discipline of the bloc of states under Soviet influence; and the existence of such a bloc tended to create a counter-bloc of Western states despite the fact that France and some other nations tried systematically to mediate and take an independent middle position on disputed points. Though a Peace Conference in name, the atmosphere of the Conference was certainly not one of peace and international concord.

By mid-December 1946 the process of peace-making had quite lost its original meaning. When Byrnes took office as US Secretary of State he had imagined himself bringing peace to Europe and the world in a matter of months. Instead, he had faced systematic obstruction and a barrage of hostile propaganda from Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the end had very little to show for the high hopes with which he had launched his peace-making career. It seems right to say that Molotov outmanoeuvred him. Molotov played one game and Byrnes had tried to play another. Liberal principles – equality of access of all nations to the trade of the world, civil liberties, democracy, disarmament of ex-enemy countries – these had been the goals which the American government initially set themselves to realise through the peace treaties. Molotov on the contrary set out to protect Russia's special position in Eastern Europe. He succeeded, Byrnes failed – partly because of Molotov's tactics, partly because Byrnes's own approach to the problems of peace was so much based on his ideology.

Appeals to democratic principles not backed by significant force merely irritated the Russians without impressing them, the more so since the democratic principles which Byrnes and Bevin supported would have weakened or destroyed Russia's influence in the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union's western border. A 'spheres of influence' deal with the Russians might have been possible; and if Britain and America had been prepared to maintain large military forces in Western Europe they might have been able to compel the Russians to act with more restraint in Eastern Europe. But neither policy was tried; and the actual fruit of Byrnes's diplomacy was a setback rather than a gain for the West.

Yet Molotov's apparent success was a larger defeat. His behaviour at the successive meetings of the foreign ministers had alienated public sympathy in America and Britain. More than that, Molotov's diplomacy had done much to persuade the American government and people to adopt an actively anti-Russian policy and had prevented American withdrawal from Europe on the scale and timetable Byrnes originally imagined. Rudely awakening the American giant from dreams of easy peace, stirring old fears of Communism in American hearts, loosening American purse strings for the support of non-Communist countries: these by-products of Molotov's diplomacy were not in accord with Russian long-range interests. By seeking to hold what had been won in the war, and by threatening to expand into new areas, the Russians prompted the creation of what they most feared – an anti-Russian coalition led by the United States – but these consequences were not fully apparent until later; in the short run Stalin and Molotov could congratulate themselves on having taken clever advantage of the peace negotiations to safeguard Russian predominance in Eastern Europe.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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