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HISTORY

9389/33

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

October/November 2018

1 hour

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains **three** sections:

Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939

Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust

Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The marks are given in brackets [] at the end of each question.

This document consists of **4** printed pages and **1** Insert.

Section A: Topic 1**The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939****1** Read the extract and then answer the question.

Did new, sustained or compelling impulses towards African empire arise in British politics or business during the 1880s? The evidence seems unconvincing. The late Victorians seem to have been no keener to rule and develop Africa than their fathers. The businessman saw no greater future there, except in the south; the politician was as reluctant to expand and administer a tropical African empire as the mid-Victorians had been; and plainly Parliament was no more eager to pay for it. British opinion restrained rather than prompted ministers to act in Africa. Hence they had to rely on private companies or colonial governments to act for them. It is true that African lobbies and a minority of imperialists did what they could to persuade government to advance. Yet they were usually too weak to be decisive. Measured by the yardstick of official thinking, there was no strong political or commercial movement in Britain in favour of African acquisitions.

The priorities of policy in tropical Africa confirm this impression. West Africa seemed to offer better prospects of markets and raw materials than East Africa and the Upper Nile, yet it was upon these poorer countries that the British government concentrated its efforts. Those regions of Africa which interested the British investor and merchant least, concerned ministers the most. No expansion of commerce prompted the territorial claims to Uganda, the east coast and the Nile valley. Private enterprise was not moving in to develop them; and they were no more useful or necessary to the British industrial economy between 1880 and 1900 than they had been earlier in the century. Notions of carving out colonial estates for settlers hardly entered into British calculations until the late 1880s, when it was almost too late to affect the outcome. Nor were ministers fooled by the romantic glories of ruling desert and bush. Their territorial claims were not made for the sake of African empire or commerce as such. They were little more than by-products of an enforced search for better security in the Mediterranean and the East.

To be sure, a variety of different interests in London – some religious and humanitarian, others strictly commercial or financial, and yet others imperialist – pressed for territorial advances, and were sometimes used to bring them about. In West Africa, the traders called for government protection; in Uganda and Nyasaland, the missionaries and the anti-slavery groups called for annexation; in Egypt, the bondholders asked government to rescue their investments; in South Africa, humanitarians and imperialists called for more government from Whitehall, while British traders and investors were divided about the best way of looking after their interests. Ministers usually only listened to these pleas when it suited their purpose. Commercial and humanitarian pressures rarely decided which territories should be claimed or occupied, although these concerns were frequently used by government in its public justifications.

It is the private calculations and actions of ministers far more than their speeches which reveal the primary motives behind their advances. For all the different situations in which territory was claimed, and all the different reasons which were given to justify it, one consideration, and one alone, entered into all the major decisions. In all regions north of Rhodesia, the broad imperative was the safety of routes to the East. If the papers left by policymakers are to be believed, they moved into Africa, not to build a new African empire, but to protect the old empire in India. What decided when and where they would go forward was their traditional conception of world strategy.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: Topic 2**The Holocaust****2** Read the extract and then answer the question.

In pre-war Germany Jewish women shared the predicament of Jewish men: economic decline, political disenfranchisement, concern for their children's futures, and increasing social exclusion. Jewish women also shared the reactions of Jewish men: disbelief, outrage and fear. Still, their experiences and responses were gendered, based on their socialisation and their economic and familial roles. The desire to emigrate presents a striking example. Wives usually saw the danger signals first and urged husbands to leave Germany. The different attitudes of men and women seem to reflect a gender-specific reaction remarked upon by sociologists and psychologists: in dangerous situations, men tend to 'stand their ground', whereas women avoid conflict, preferring flight as a strategy.

A more important reason why men hesitated came from their role as breadwinners. Those still employed, or whose business limped along, could not imagine how they would support their family abroad, without the language, capital or skill needed in countries of emigration. In addition, men's connection to their work and women's lack of ties to the public world of job or business made it easier for women to take their leave. Men, whose primary identity was with their work, often felt trapped into staying. Women, whose identity was more family-oriented, struggled to preserve what was central to them by fleeing with it.

Men and women also interpreted daily events differently. Although less integrated than men into the economy and culture, women were more integrated into their community. They were accustomed to neighbourly exchanges and courtesies, occasional visits to the school, attendance at concerts or local lectures, and participation in women's organisations. Raised to be sensitive to interpersonal behaviour and social situations, they registered the increasing hostility of their immediate surroundings and their children's schools. In contrast, men mediated their experiences through newspapers and broadcasts. Men tended to view their situation in terms of abstract rights, whereas women looked at actual affiliations and relationships.

Gender differences in perceiving danger do not mean that gender roles remained static. Instead, we find anxious but energetic women who greatly expanded their traditional roles. Many Jewish women, who had never worked outside the home before, now searched for employment. Some did not have to look far. They worked for husbands who had to let employees go. Jewish newspapers found relatively few families in which the wife did not work in some way to earn a living, and noted that women were sole supporters in many families.

Yet, even if women picked up and reacted to warning signals differently from men, and even if women expanded their former roles dramatically, we should be very clear that neither women nor men had actual control over the situation. First, the signals of Nazi intentions occurred in stages, and women too could be confused by policies and events. The writing was not clearly on the wall. They did not have our advantage of hindsight. Alice Nauen and her friends 'saw it was getting worse. But until 1939 nobody in our circles believed it would lead to an end for German Jewry'. Women could not magically create safe havens for their families. We need to remember that the perceptions of women or men were not the main factor affecting emigration. Even if all Jews had tried to escape in good time, the major obstacle to mass emigration lay in foreign governments bolting their doors against refugees.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: Topic 3**The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950****3** Read the extract and then answer the question.

Conflict over Eastern Europe at the end of the war did not arise in an environment of American ignorance and false expectations about the Soviet Union. American officials understood Soviet intentions to establish predominant influence in Eastern Europe, knew what actions the Soviets were taking, and recognised the limitations placed upon American initiatives to promote United States' goals. After Yalta, no one doubted that friendly governments in Eastern Europe meant minority Communist governments. Misperception of Soviet ambitions or actions in Eastern Europe was not the cause of conflict.

Conflict also did not issue from a United States' attempt to construct a balance of power to meet the establishment of Soviet military and political predominance in Eastern Europe. US policy towards Eastern Europe from 1941 to 1945 was not motivated by the same kind of balance-of-power considerations which later prompted the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan or NATO. The development of this conflict further cannot be ascribed to a group of men conspiring to obtain economic markets for American commerce. The United States never sought to prevent the establishment of Soviet economic predominance in Eastern Europe, and saw no vital economic interests in that part of the world. Finally, conflict did not develop from any specific United States' determination to contain the Bolsheviks and all other leftist movements. Military, economic or right-wing interests did not lurk behind US rhetoric in favour of the holding of free elections. United States' policy towards Eastern Europe was less devious and less coherent than this, and the conflict that developed was neither planned nor calculated.

In fact US officials followed Atlantic Charter principles and undertook efforts to ensure the creation of representative governments in Eastern Europe without recognising that Soviet–American conflict would be the result. They never saw in advance the effects their policies would have. Despite Soviet insistence on friendly governments and reports that if truly free elections were held then Soviet-sponsored governments would be ousted, American officials did not realise that their policies might seem to threaten the vital security interests of the Soviet Union. They tended to define Soviet security interests in terms identical with those of the United States: implementation of the Atlantic Charter principles, disarmament of Germany, and the formation of a new international organisation. They simply assumed that free elections would not preclude the creation of friendly governments. American officials did not consciously obstruct Soviet security interests, neither did they want to. Thus, they were completely unprepared for the firmness of Soviet opposition to free elections, and the conflict which then resulted. They therefore never undertook initiatives which might have resolved the differences which had arisen. They never attempted to communicate to the Soviet Union exactly what they could and could not tolerate in Eastern Europe. These officials regularly acknowledged to themselves that the Soviet Union would exercise 'predominant' influence in Eastern Europe and that the Soviet Union had 'more direct' interests in that part of the world than the United States. They never defined, however, what they meant by these statements. More importantly, they neither informed the Soviet Union of their willingness to recognise Soviet predominance, nor undertook to clarify exactly what US intentions were. This failure to communicate the specific nature of American goals in Eastern Europe resulted in no serious effort being undertaken by either government to work out a possible compromise. When during 1945 conflict increased and became intertwined with other issues, for example over Greece and Italy, no one proposed that the United States agree to Soviet demands in Eastern Europe in return for Soviet agreement on these other issues.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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