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Cambridge Assessment International Education

Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY **9489/31**

Paper 3 Interpretations Question **October/November 2022**

1 hour 15 minutes

0359555405

You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.
  - Section A: The origins of the First World War
  - Section B: The Holocaust
  - Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [ ].

This document has **4** pages.

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Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section A: Topic 1

The origins of the First World War

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The Russian Finance Minister shared Nicholas II's optimism. Given the immense success of the German economy in recent years, they could not believe that Berlin would risk everything by starting an unnecessary war. They were wrong. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was designed to make war inevitable. Vienna believed that its position in the Balkans could only be restored by forcing Belgrade back into dependence on Austria. Other Balkan states would learn from this that opposition to Vienna did not pay, and that in the last resort Russia would not protect its clients at the risk of war. The Austrians tended to believe that fear of revolution would make Russia back down. If not, Vienna and Berlin agreed that it was better to start a war now than to delay matters, since Russia's resources, together with the rapid growth of its economic and military strength, would make victory for the Central Powers unobtainable in a few years' time. Now it seems certain that the only thing which might have deterred the Germans was a belief that Britain would enter the war on the side of Russia and France. But by the time the likelihood of British intervention had become clear, Austro-German policy had gone too far to make peaceful compromise possible without great damage to Austrian and German prestige. The first rather hesitant calls to Vienna for restraint from the German Chancellor were in any case undermined by contrary advice from Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff. Moreover, even by 29 July the Central Powers' position remained that Russia must cease military preparations while the Austrian offensive in Serbia be allowed to proceed. No one in St Petersburg could have accepted such terms. Nicholas II was much less enthusiastic about the Balkan Slavs than some of his ministers, let alone public opinion. But in January 1914 he had promised, 'We will not let ourselves be trampled upon.'

At the crucial meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers that took place on the afternoon of 24 July, Sazonov maintained that Austria-Hungary and Germany were determined to deal a decisive blow at Russian authority in the Balkans by annihilating Serbia. He argued that Russia could not allow this to happen. Domestic political considerations counted for something: 'Public and parliamentary opinion would fail to understand why, at this critical moment involving Russia's vital interests, the Imperial Government was reluctant to act boldly.' More important were considerations of national honour and prestige. Given Russia's centuries-old role in the Balkans, if it allowed itself to be driven out of the region in such a total and humiliating way, no one would take it seriously again. Russia's obvious weakness and many concessions since 1905 had not brought security. Instead, they had merely encouraged its opponents to push it around. If Russia conceded again despite so blatant a challenge to its interests, no one – ally or enemy – would believe it would ever stand up for itself. Even if it deserted its Balkan allies, it could very possibly still be forced to fight in the near future in the face of further German challenges. Sazonov admitted that 'war with Germany would bring great risks', particularly since it was not known what the attitude of Great Britain would be. Nevertheless he, and with him the whole Council of Ministers, decided that if Austria refused all negotiations and insisted on the invasion of Serbia, Russia could not stand aside. Russia would mobilise four military districts in the hope that this would be a warning to Austria but not a provocation to Germany.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer. [40]

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Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The first deportations of German Jews in mid-October 1941 had not always resulted in instant death. An element of uncertainty about how to deal with them is suggested by a letter in December 1941 from Wilhelm Kube (General Commissar of Byelorussia and a longtime Nazi Party member) to Heinrich Lohse (Reich Commissar for Ostland) describing the condition of German Jews who had been sent to Minsk, and asking for clear directives. Kube observed that these Jews included First World War heroes decorated with the Iron Cross, war invalids, and half and even three-quarter 'Aryans'. He asserted that they differed sharply from Russian Jews in their skills, productivity and 'personal cleanliness'. These German Jews were 'people who come from our own cultural sphere, not at all like the brutish hordes in this place'. Kube asked if the proposed slaughter was to be carried out by Lithuanians and Latvians, 'themselves rejected by the population here', and respectfully requested that the 'necessary action be taken in the most humane manner'. He did not want to give an order for liquidation on his own authority.

Kube's concerns make it clear that the application of the genocidal plan to German Jews was not immediately self-evident, even for some hardened Party members. This fact was reflected in the delay – until late 1941 – in requiring Jews of the Reich to wear the yellow star, or in finally completing the deportations from Germany. The Nazi regime proceeded more cautiously in this area, since the forcible removal of German Jews could not be hidden from the population and might provoke uncomfortable questions.

An even more serious potential obstacle to a speedy and comprehensive elimination of the Jews arose from the usefulness to the German military machine of industrious Jewish workers in the eastern territories. The SS was determined to overrule, wherever possible, such practical considerations. This would be made crystal clear in reply to an important query raised in November 1941 by Lohse, who had written to the Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories concerning Jewish workers. He wished to know if there was a 'directive to liquidate all the Jews in Ostland'. Was this to be done 'regardless of age, sex and economic requirements' (for instance, the Wehrmacht's demand for skilled workers in the armaments industry)? Lohse was all in favour of the 'cleansing of Ostland of Jews', but he was also sensitive to the needs of the armaments plants and repair workshops. To deprive the factories of Jewish workers 'through their liquidation' when they could not yet be replaced by local personnel did not seem sensible to Lohse. The reply he received, signed by liaison officer Otto Bräutigam, was significant: 'The Jewish Question has presumably been clarified meanwhile by means of verbal discussion. In principle, economic considerations are not to be taken into account in the settlement of the problem. It is further requested that any questions that arise be settled directly with the Higher SS and Police Leader.'

It is evident from such correspondence that the implications of the 'Final Solution' were not always apparent to those in the field who were expected to implement it. Undoubtedly there was much administrative chaos and confusion, and many clashing interests and logistical problems that needed improvised solutions. But that does not mean that the mass murder of the European Jews was something that the Nazis just stumbled into, without any centralised control or ideological guidelines. Undoubtedly, for Hitler, the genocide was a matter of grand policy, though he left the execution of its details to trusted subordinates.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

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Section C: Topic 3

The origins and development of the Cold War

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

This is the sense in which it seems to me that ideology was enormously important for the origins of the Cold War. In the Soviet Union there was a series of domestic factors which led to the need for an external enemy. By the end of the war, although the Stalinist state remained unchallenged, its ideological framework had been shaken – in a sense deliberately – in the interests of rallying popular support for the wartime alliance with the West, because the alliance was necessary for the survival of the regime. During the war there was much less focus on Marxism-Leninism. There was a dilution of ideology, and more emphasis was placed on patriotic themes. This led many intellectuals to hope for a relaxation of the dictatorship after the war. In contrast, Stalin was more aware than ever of the need to reestablish the kinds of political controls which he deemed necessary for the massive task of reconstruction. Sixty-six years old at the end of the war, he was also bound to consider the struggle for succession. His objectives could be accomplished only through a regeneration of ideology, through – more specifically – the identification of an external enemy. If one thinks of the alternatives open to Stalin, you reach the conclusion that all alternative courses were quite simply unacceptable to him. From Stalin's point of view, the Soviet system would have had to pay, or least run the risk of having to pay, a totally unacceptable price for a continuation of the wartime cooperation, which in any case had only been intermittent. But I also believe that the very ideological threat to the Soviet system implicit in the involvement of the United States in world affairs – alas, not strong enough at that time to make it a real threat – nonetheless did reinvigorate Stalin's drive for Soviet ideological purity.

These observations leave open the question of whether or not the Cold War at its most intense and rigid was really inevitable or not. The answer to that question depends on your view of history, I suppose. All I want to suggest is that a continuation of those tentative lines of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West which had developed during the war years was, for a variety of quite understandable Soviet domestic considerations, quite unacceptable to Stalin. I regard Stalin's point of view not as the assessment of a madman but rather as the perception of a shrewd leader, accustomed to the burdens of power. He was conscious of his own objectives and all too aware of those Soviet realities that seemed to call their achievement into question. Given this situation, something like the Cold War as it actually occurred was the inevitable outcome of Western policies.

Perhaps Stalin would have preferred non-involvement in world affairs altogether. But isolationism was no longer a genuine alternative for a Soviet Union which, despite all its obvious post-war weaknesses, still was one of the two major Powers in a divided international system. This being the case, further scholarly progress in exploring the roots of the Cold War can, it seems to me, come by concentrating more closely than we have up till now upon the domestic foundations of Soviet foreign policy. Reexamination of the strengths and weaknesses of the diplomacy of the two sides may still be necessary; but it can never be sufficient. In the Cold War, it is time to assert the primacy of domestic, rather than foreign, policy.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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