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Cambridge Assessment International Education

Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY **9489/33**

Paper 3 Interpretations Question **October/November 2022**

1 hour 15 minutes

4465238821

You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.
  - Section A: The origins of the First World War
  - Section B: The Holocaust
  - Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [ ].

This document has **4** pages.

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Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section A: Topic 1

The origins of the First World War

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Most of the literature on the events of 1914 understandably asks why the Great War broke out.

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Why, in other words, did the peace fail?

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer. [40]

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Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Hitler's hand appears only rarely in the actual making of Jewish policy between 1933 and 1938. One can only conclude from this that he occupied his time with more important concerns. In part the shifts and inconsistencies of Jewish policy during the first five years of Nazi rule stem from his failure to offer guidance. A clear and consistent policy was virtually impossible without the Führer himself making basic decisions or delegating to a subordinate the authority to make such decisions for him. The fact that he avoided both of these options until late 1938 encouraged the independent and often rival policies pursued by factions within the Nazi movement. It also made inevitable the trial and error approach to the Jewish problem which marked the period to November 1938. There were definite advantages for Hitler in keeping his distance, of course. He could learn from the trials and disassociate himself from the errors.

At no point did Hitler consider retreating on the Jewish issue, an option which distancing himself from policy-making left open. There were many points at which a quiet retreat would have been possible. In fact, there were many times when it was feared by the radical racists that Hitler was doing just that. The Nuremberg Laws were followed by Hitler's announcement that the persecution of Jews was to be ended after the discriminatory measures had taken effect. While they were less explicit, the temporary retreats after the boycott of 1933 had seemed to point in a similar direction. These turned out to be no more than tactical retreats, however, or unspoken admissions of failure. Naturally these failures were always publicised as significant successes. Hitler did not accept failure. Reluctant as he was to offer specific guidelines on Jewish policy, he was not looking for a convenient way to abandon the struggle against the Jews.

Each one of the failures during these first years of Nazi rule – whether of boycott, legislation, Aryanisation or immigration – was the signal for renewed effort. The failure of a specific policy or action might discredit a particular group; it did not discourage others from trying their own hand at finding a solution. Failure in these circumstances was relative, of course. The thousands of Jews who suffered from the legislation, who lost their businesses, or were forced to emigrate would have been hard to convince that Nazi efforts of persecution had failed. That the Nazis considered these efforts to have failed, however, indicates that failure was considered to be anything less than absolute success. If one Jew was boycotted, all Jews had to be boycotted. If one Jewish business was to be Aryanised, all had to be Aryanised. The same held true for any other policy, be it immigration or finally murder.

The extreme aims of these Jewish policies prior to the war virtually ensured their failure. Jewish policy had to be pursued in the real world, not in the fantasy world of Nazi propaganda. This policy, like any other, had to be pursued in a world structured by unemployment, foreign currency shortages, a need for imports, German military weaknesses, pressures from outside Germany, and the very real fact of bitter internal party rivalries. The search for a solution to the Jewish problem had been set into motion by the anti-Semitic energies which constituted the heart of Nazism; it was driven forward by the frustrations of each successive failure. A more extreme approach appeared to be the only alternative to the less-than-final solutions which had proved unsatisfactory or unworkable.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

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Section C: Topic 3

The origins and development of the Cold War

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

By early 1945, Stalin could confidently envisage a Europe so weak and fragmented that none of its states would be capable of resisting his will. The political collapse of Europe brought about by Germany's aggression opened up for the Soviet Union the attractive prospect of its being able to act after the war as the controller of the continent. In Stalin's scheme of things, military seizure of territory for political gain was less important than has usually been assumed. In their readiness to agree in advance conquests he had not yet made, the Western powers mistook his ability to use force for a determination to use it. This may not have made a difference to the fate of Poland, but could have in the case of Hungary, where the Red Army only moved in when the British and Americans, for their own military reasons, chose not to act on Stalin's suggestions that they should advance on it themselves.

Stalin made the achievement of his preferred post-war order dependent less on the progress of the war than on the emergence after its conclusion of a favourable international environment. He tried to accomplish what he wanted with, rather than against, his powerful Western allies, whose support he regarded as vital for achieving the kind of security he sought. Nowhere beyond what Moscow considered the Soviet borders did its policies foresee the establishment of communist regimes.

In shaping the post-war order, the February 1945 Yalta conference was not as important as its later reputation suggested. No deal about the division of Europe into spheres of influence was struck there. However, despite their growing concerns about Soviet intentions, the Western Allies did little to discourage Stalin from thinking that he could take their agreement for granted. The outcome of the August summit conference at Potsdam was seen as acknowledging that the West had lost eastern Europe and the Balkans. By the end of the year the West had accepted, however unhappily, the Soviet takeover there after a few changes to local governments in the region had, in Kennan's words, 'attached some fig leaves of democratic procedure to hide the nakedness of Stalinist dictatorship'. Stalin's quest for security by empire could not have been more successful.

Victory in the Second World War promised the Soviet Union more security than it had ever had, yet it was not enough for Stalin. His overwhelming desire for it was the root cause of the growing East-West tension, regardless of his and his Western partners' desire for manageable, if not necessarily friendly, relations. The forthcoming Cold War was both unintended and unexpected, but it was predetermined all the same. None other than Litvinov expressed through his indiscreet remarks to visiting Westerners the opinion that his government's drive for security without clearly defined limits was the primary cause of trouble. However, the West's failure to resist it early and firmly enough was an important secondary cause. But Molotov, Stalin's chief diplomat, saw nothing wrong. Later he explained the origins and nature of the quarrel as follows: 'All this simply happened because we were advancing. They, of course, hardened against us, and we had to firm up what we had conquered. Everywhere it was necessary to make order and suppress capitalist ways. That's what the Cold War was about'. So, Molotov agreed with Litvinov in his judgement that the conflict had arisen from Soviet actions, but still insisted that Stalin 'knew the limits'.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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